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Abstract We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be
provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats,
or mafia dons). Although self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems
of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security, the equilibrium market struc-
ture involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the
savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as
low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state. Thus, we explain the tendency
towards autocracy both in history, before the appearance of modern representative
governance, and in many low-income countries in modern times.
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0 Introduction
The collective good variously referred to as security, order, protection of property
rights, or simply, protection, is a precondition for the provision of ordinary infra-
structural public goods and generally for facilitating trade and economic development.
Historically, it has also been the first type of good provided by states and is often con-
sidered the quintessential and defining attribute of the state.1
Protection and its variations, though, are different from other collective goods
because of the following characteristic: the inputs that are used for its production—sol-
diers and policemen, swords and guns—contain the seeds for the good’s own destruc-
tion. Policemen and soldiers, by virtue of their positions, could extract even more
than the robbers and bandits they are supposed to guard against. Similarly, rulers who
provide protection against internal and external threats can use their power of extrac-
tion at an even grander scale. Army generals and colonels, ostensibly at the service
of democratic governments, can, and regularly do, topple such governments. Clearly,
protection is not an ordinary good.
In this paper, we argue that taking into account such peculiarities in the provision
of protection leads to the understanding of two important tendencies, both in history
and in the present. First, competition for the provision of protection often takes a very
different form than the one we are accustomed to in economics: private providers of
protection, instead of competing on the price of their service, typically compete with
their means of violence over turf. Under such predatory competition, more competi-
tion leads to worse outcomes. Second, our approach helps in understanding the wide
prevalence of autocracy, instead of self-governance, in the provision of protection and
more generally in the organization of governance.
The type of competition usually examined within economics is one in which differ-
ent jurisdictions attempt to attract mobile subjects through lower taxation, other privi-
leges, and the provision of public goods. Whereas this type of competition is common
nowadays and some economic historians (e.g. North and Thomas 1973) have argued
for its importance in the rise of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form
that has existed in the past or the sole form of competition that is taking place today.
From Ancient Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or Medieval Europe, serfs
were tied to the land and free peasants had few outside options, with rulers coming
and going but without any change in their incentives for production. Emperors, kings,
and princes were fighting for territory and the rents that come with it just as, in more
recent times, mafiosi and warlords fight for turf and their accompanying protection
rents. Under such conditions, the tribute or protection money paid depends on the
relative ability of each side in the use of force. Promising a lower tribute on the part
of a provider of protection is not credible unless it reflects that relative power of the
1 In the sense, following Weber’s definition, that the provider of protection also has the monopoly in the
legitimate use of force (Weber 1978). Of course, in practice, no actual state has a monopoly in the use
of force. For example, the Russian Federal government exerts little control on some republics, mafias, or
officials within its territory. Similarly, but less dramatically, US authorities exert not much control in some
American inner cities. Weber’s usage of the term “legitimate” was likely meant to overcome this problem,
although other questions emerge about the meaning of the term, especially for economists.
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two sides, the ruler and his agents on one side and the ordinary producer usually on
the other.
In analyzing the behavior of for-profit providers of protection (or, states), we exam-
ine two market structures or regimes: the form of monopolistic competition that we
have just described as well as monopoly. The most likely stable outcome that emerges
endogenously is to have multiple for-profit states. Each state hires guards to protect its
sequestered peasants from bandits, hires warriors to protect its borders from the other
states, and receives income from tribute extracted from its peasant subjects. Moreover,
under the regime with competing predatory states, under the conditions, we examine
total output can even be lower than without a state; all the savings accruing from the
provision of internal protection are dissipated in fighting over the same rents created
by those savings, whereas states can extract more than simple bandits can. Thus, as far
as the market for protection is concerned, and as another manifestation of the peculiar
character of the provision of protection, competition is not a good thing.
Another set of market structures, we examine involve self-governing groups of pro-
ducers, with and without competition from for-profit states. The consensually orga-
nized, self-governing state could survive in the absence of predators, and although
collective security would be underprovided and the state would be small in size, the
welfare of peasants and bandits would be highest under such a market structure. In the
presence of competing predators, however, we have found no long-run equilibrium
in which a self-governing state would be viable. Because self-governing states face
the free-rider problem, they have to be small. Being small in the presence of larger
predators though, necessitates too much expenditure per person on external as well as
internal security, leaving little room for production with a resultant welfare lower than
even the subjects of a predator would enjoy. Thus, this finding helps in understanding
the prevalence of autocracy.
The difficulty of establishing democracy and self-governance and the prevalence
of autocracy is apparent from many recent experiences as well as more distant ones.
From Indonesia to Africa, most post-colonial states have experienced coups and dic-
tatorships to a much greater degree than democratic governance. Earlier, during the
nineteenth century the first post-colonial states of Latin America have had similar
fates. Our findings are also very relevant to the almost complete absence of self-
governance during the time between the agricultural revolution and two centuries ago
(see, e.g. Finer 1997).2 Our approach is most relevant for this time period given that our
model does not allow for the complex institutional web of modern mass representative
democracy.3
2 Possible exceptions include city-states in early Mesopotamia, Ancient Greece, and late Medieval Italy.
Of course, all of these are subject to many qualifications as the democratic franchise did not include slaves,
women, and often most of the rest of the male population because of property qualifications.
3 We should mention two analytically distinct, but complementary reasons to the one we examine in this
paper for the difficulties of self-governance’s survival. First, coordination problems inherent in democratic
decision-making might provide an advantage to the hierarchical decision-making that usually prevails in
the for-profit provision of protection. The formal incorporation of this reason in our model would not be
difficult and would reinforce our results. In fact, representative democracy can be thought of as an attempt
to get around the coordination problems of democracy. However, inherent in representative democracy
is the second reason that limits self-governance, the so-called “iron law of oligarch” first identified by
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Our approach is still helpful though in understanding what occurs in places in which
the reach of the modern state is weak. That includes many “failed” states as well as
the areas within modern states with power vacuums that allow warlords, gangs, and
mafias to develop. As Gambetta (1993) argues the primary commodity sold by the
Sicilian mafia is protection (for modeling dedicated to the activities of mafias and
gangs see Grossman 1995; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1995, and other contributions
in Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995; Konrad and Skaperdas 1997, 1998). We tell a story
with peasants and bandits which also applies to interactions among shopkeepers and
robbers in Moscow, Los Angeles, or Lagos. In the latter case, gangs and mafias come in
to fill the gap vacated by the modern state, supplanting it and creating a near-monopoly
of force in their area. We help understand why genuine community policing is difficult
and why gangs arise in conditions with a power vacuum.
When compared with other work that has viewed the state as maximizing its reve-
nue while providing a public good (Engineer 1989; Findlay 1990; Grossman and Noh
1994; Marcouiller and Young 1995; McGuire and Olson 1996; Moselle and Polak
2001), we take account of the aforementioned peculiar status of protection relative to
other public goods. We also allow for the distribution of output, including taxation by
the state, to depend explicitly on the relative ability of affected parties to use force.
Thus, taxation has a direct resource cost, whereas the cost of taxation in the existing
literature is indirect, as deadweight loss or reduction in market activities. More impor-
tantly, in contrast to all this work which supposes a single Leviathan monopolistic
state, we allow for different types—for-profit and self-governing—and the combina-
tions of market structures that become then possible. Usher (1989) is probably closest
to this paper; but while we are interested primarily in contrasting the different types
of states that can arise, Usher’s main interest is in the alternation between despotism
and anarchy.4 Grossman and Noh (1994) and Myerson (2008) are promising explo-
rations on how restraints on rulers can evolve based on the dynamic considerations.
Grossman and Noh (1994) show how a ruler’s discounting of the future is endogenous
to his taxing and spending decisions and the factors that might lead to less kleptocratic
policies. Myerson (2008) shows how rulers could do better when there are restraints
on their rule, interpreted as constitution checks on a ruler’s power, and how these can
emerge as equilibria in dynamic contests for power.
Because of the different market structures of different complexities that we exam-
ine, we start with the simplest one, anarchy, and gradually build to the more complex
ones while trying to maintain comparisons with those analyzed earlier.
Footnote 3 continued
Michels (1962): the tendency of representative insitutions and organizations to be hijacked by their elected
representatives and officers, primarily due to the informational asymmetry that develops between represen-
tatives and the represented. It would be difficult to incorporate this reason in our modeling, although it is
clearly an important one that complements our own.
4 Usher’s model is considerably more complicated than ours, but his analysis is mainly graphical. Warneryd
(1993) also shows some of the difficulties inherent in contractarian stories for the emergence of state orga-
nization and property rights. Another related area of research from economics is on the determinants of the
size of states (Friedman 1977; Wittman 1991; Findlay 1996; Alesina and Spolaore 2006, and the survey in
Spolaore 2006). Our approach adds to this literature by deriving the determinants of size, as well as type,
from an explicit optimizing model.
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1 Peasants and bandits in anarchy
We begin with the simplest setting in which there is an absence of collective orga-
nizations. Individuals out of a population N sort themselves among peasant farmers
and bandits where the latter make a living by preying on the peasants. A similar story
could be told for an anarchic urban setting by having—instead of peasants and ban-
dits—workers and robbers as the two possible occupations. Each peasant has one unit
of a resource that he can distribute between work and self-protection—the higher is
the level of self-protection, the lower is the amount of work and the lower is the output
that can be produced. Denoting this self-protection activity by x ∈ [0, 1], the peasant
can keep a share p(x) of output away from bandits, where p(x) is non-decreasing in
x, p(x) ∈ [0, 1], p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. We will introduce additional assumptions
on p(x) as needed later (in Assumption 2 in Sect. 2). The payoff of a peasant is as
follows:
Up = p(x)(1 − x) (1)
Each peasant chooses a level of self-protection x so as to maximize this payoff in
(1). We suppose a unique such level, denoted by x∗. For the remainder of this paper,
we also denote the payoff associated with x∗ by U∗p .
The bandits roam the countryside looking for peasants to prey upon. Let Np denote
the number of peasants and let Nb > 0 represent the number of bandits. A bandit’s
payoff is as follows:
Ub = [1 − p(x)](1 − x) NpNb (2)
That is, bandits extract 1− p(x) of output from each peasant and the more peasants
there are relative to bandits, the better it is for a bandit.5 Note the absence of dependence
of p(x) on numbers of peasants and bandits. As our model becomes considerably more
complicated in several other dimensions later, this assumption simplifies our analysis
by making x∗ independent of the numbers of bandits and peasants. The independence
of x∗ continues to hold if the share of output kept by a peasant were to be specified
as p(x, Np/Nb) = r(x)γ Np/Nb where γ is a positive parameter representing the
defensive ability of peasants and r(x) an appropriately specified increasing function.
Given that a peasant’s payoff is uniquely determined by the choice of x∗ (and equals
U∗p), we are interested in an equilibrium state, whereby the numbers of bandits and
peasants adjust until a bandit’s payoff equals that of a peasant. Formally, an anar-
chic equilibrium is a number of peasants N∗p , a number of bandits N∗b , and a bandit’s
5 We should mention that the function p(x) could take a probabilistic interpretation, denoting the prob-
ability of the peasant prevailing in a conflictual encounter with a bandit (such a function can be justified
axiomatically or in other ways as in Hirshleifer (1989); Skaperdas (1996); Clark and Riis (1998); Jia (2008);
Rai and Sarin (2009), and Corchón and Dahm (2010).) Given the risk neutrality of the two types of agents
in (1) and (2), a peasant and bandit would be indifferent between such conflict and dividing output with a
share p(x) going to the peasant and the remainder going to the bandit.
123
422 K. A. Konrad, S. Skaperdas
payoff U∗b such that N∗p + N∗b = N and U∗b = U∗p .6 Provided p(x) is continuous, in
equilibrium the numbers of peasants and bandits are then given by:
N∗p = p(x∗)N and N∗b = [1 − p(x∗)]N (3)
The easier it is to defend output from bandits, as captured by the properties of
the function p(·) and the amount of self-protection induced, the more peasants there
are relative to bandits. Total output, which we will use in welfare comparisons with
collective forms of the organization of protection that we will examine later, equals:
N∗p(1 − x∗) = p(x∗)(1 − x∗)N (4)
When compared with the “Nirvana” condition without banditry, in which total
output would equal N , the lower output under anarchy has two sources: (i) the fact
that bandits do not contribute anything to production [the associated welfare loss
equals [1 − p(x∗)]N ] and (ii) those who become peasants have to divert a fraction of
their resources toward self-protection [the associate welfare loss is p(x∗)x∗N ].7
2 Collective protection
In addition to each peasant taking self-protection measures against bandits privately,
several peasants, a village, or a district could take protection measures collectively and
such measures can include simple warning systems about the presence of bandits in the
area, the formation of a militia that becomes active when there is a threat, the building
of rudimentary fortifications to protect crops or other property, or the employment of
full-time guards and policemen. We abstract from the particular forms that collective
protection takes and we simply suppose that collective protection can be provided
more efficiently than self-protection. Letting z ∈ [0, 1] denote the group’s average
per peasant expenditure on collective protection consisting of k peasants, the effective
expenditure on collective protection (equivalent to expenditures on self-protection)
received by each peasant is a function f (z) with the following properties:
6 To avoid unnecessary complications we allow for non-integer numbers of peasants and bandits.When
these numbers are non-integer in equilibrium, we suppose that I nt[N∗b ] become bandits and I nt[N∗p]
become peasants (where I nt[z] denotes the largest integer that is smaller or equal to z). One agent, then,
spends v∗ = N∗p − I nt[N∗p] portion of his time as a peasant and the remainder as a bandit. The agent’s
portion of the payoff as peasant equals p( x
∗
v∗ )(v
∗ − x∗), with the optimal time spent on self-protection
equalling x∗v∗ which yields a payoff of p(x∗)(v∗ − x∗v∗) = v∗ p(x∗)(1 − x∗) = v∗U∗p . With the
payoff of the same agent from part-time banditry equalling (1 − v∗)U∗b , the total equilibrium payoff thus
equals that of any other agent, peasant or bandit. Grossman (1991) models every single agent, not just a
marginal one, as allocating time between different occupations (farming, banditry, and soldiering). The
justification of continuous variables in the different occupations that we employed here, also holds for the
other occupations, the numbers of which we assume continuous in the rest of the paper (guards, warriors,
praetorians).
7 With p(x) = x , we have x∗ = 1/2, there are as many bandits as peasants and total output is 1/4 of
potential output.
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Assumption 1 The collective protection technology f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is defined for
groups consisting of k agents, where k ≥ k¯ for some k¯ > 1; f (·) is strictly concave,
twice differentiable, except possibly at one point, and strictly increasing. Moreover,
f (0) = 0; f (z) > z for all z ∈ (0, 1)
The share of own output retained by a peasant who has contributed xi to collective pro-
tection is p(xi + f (z)),8 where z = ∑kj=1 z jk and z j is the contribution of peasant j in
the collective protection of the group. The key property in Assumption 1 is f (z) > z,
for it implies that if each peasant in a group were to contribute z to collective pro-
tection, instead of contributing it to self-protection, he or she would receive a higher
level of effective protection overall. To have this type of protection truly collective,
we require that the number of peasants in a group is at least as high as the minimum
size k¯.
Here, we also collect all the assumptions on the function p(·) that we use.
Assumption 2 p : [0, 2] → [0, 1] is twice-differentiable (except possibly at one
point) non-decreasing and concave in its argument, p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1.9
To gain intuition about the effects of the collective protection technology and to
facilitate comparisons with the non-cooperative choice we examine later, we briefly
consider optimal choices of protection that maximize a welfare objective that takes the
size (k) and composition of a group of peasants as given. The objective is to choose
x ′i s and z′i s (i = 1, . . . , k) so as to maximize the sum of the payoffs of the peasants












Given that xi and zi have the same cost to a peasant, but the average protection
is higher with collective protection, we might expect that optimal protection should
involve collective protection only. This is not the case, however, since given the con-
cavity of f (·), the marginal return of collective protection could fall below the return
to self-protection (which, given our specification, equals unity). Thus, the optimal
choice involves choosing collective protection up to a certain point where f ′(z) ≤ 1.
When f ′(z) > 1, no self-protection is undertaken, whereas with f ′(z) = 1 some
self-protection could be undertaken. Whether or not some self-protection is optimal
depends on the functional form.
Choosing the right levels of collective and private protection would require a benev-
olent agent who would also have the power to impose such choices. This would amount
to effectively assume away the problem we set out to examine. Thus, instead our task in
the remainder it to explore different alternatives—different “industrial organizations”
of protection—that could emerge from anarchy and that utilize the more efficient
collective protection technology.
8 Similar functions that allow for both public and private protection or precautionary activities have been
used in the law and crime literature (see, e.g., Ben-Shahar and Harel 1995, or Hylton 1996).
9 Note that p(1) = 1 implies that p(xi + f (z)) = 1 for all xi + f (z) ≥ 1.
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3 Self-governance
One way of utilizing the higher efficiency of collective protection is for peasants to
form a self-governing community and voluntarily contribute to collective protection,
through a part-time peasants’ militia, through the construction of fortifications, or
other means.
Consider a group of k (≥ k¯) peasants, with the k initially given, who voluntarily
choose between production, contributions to collective protection, and self-protec-
tion, that is, each peasant i belonging to the group chooses xi and zi (and, therefore,
production which equals 1 − xi − zi ) so as to maximize his payoff as given by






These choices are made simultaneously by all peasants in the group so that they
form a Nash equilibrium (Because both f (·) and p(·) are concave (by Assumptions 1
and 2), Upi can be shown to be concave in xi and zi and, therefore, a Nash equilibrium
exists.) To analyze such equilibria, first consider peasant i’s incentives to choose xi
and zi as indicated in the following partial derivatives:
∂Upi
∂xi
= p′(xi + f (z))(1 − xi − zi ) − p(xi + f (z)) (7)
∂Upi
∂zi
= p′(xi + f (z))(1 − xi − zi ) f
′(z)
k
− p(xi + f (z)). (8)
The first term of each equation represents the marginal private benefit of each pro-
tection activity, whereas the second term represents its marginal cost. Note how the
marginal private benefit of contributing to collective protection in (8) is just 1/k of
the value of its marginal social benefit. By comparing (7) to (8), it can be seen that a
peasant’s marginal benefit of an increase in xi exceeds his of her marginal benefit of
an increase in zi if and only if f ′(z) > k. A more efficient collective protection and
a smaller group size increase the incentives for individual contributions to collective
protection. Obviously, the least interesting type of equilibrium that might occur is
one in which no collective protection is chosen and the resultant choice of individual
protection could be shown to be the same as that under anarchy (x∗). Given (7) and
(8), we can rule that type of equilibrium out when f ′(0) > k (i.e., sufficiently effec-
tive collective protection when there is no collective protection). The more interesting
types of equilibrium are the ones in which positive collective protection is chosen.
For simplicity, since the symmetric equilibrium in which individual protection is zero
has similar properties to the ones described below, we focus on the symmetric inte-
rior equilibrium in which both types of protection are used and such an equilibrium,
whereby each member of a group chooses self-protection xˆ > 0 and collective pro-
tection zˆ > 0, can be found by setting (7) and (8) equal to 0, implying f (zˆ) = k and
p′(xˆ + f (zˆ))(1 − xˆ − zˆ) = p(xˆ + f (zˆ)).10
10 Whereas the condition f ′(0) > k guarantees that collective protection will be positive, the condition
that distinguishes the interior equilibrium from the equilibrium with 0 self-protection chosen is more
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Using standard techniques under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following properties
can be shown to hold for the interior equilibrium:
(i) Equilibrium collective protection (zˆ)is strictly decreasing in k.
(ii) Equilibrium self-protection (xˆ) is strictly increasing in k
(iii) The level of protection (i.e., the share retained by each peasant p(xˆ+ f (zˆ))
is strictly higher than that under anarchy.
(iv) A peasant’s payoff is strictly decreasing in k.
Property (iv) implies that, if we were to allow for an endogenous determination
of group size, the size that would most likely emerge is the minimal one for which
collective protection is feasible (i.e., for k¯). We now introduce the possibility of an
endogenous determination of groups.
A self-governing equilibrium is a number of peasants Nˆp, a number of peasant
groups nˆ p, and a number of bandits Nˆb such that
(I) Each peasant belongs to a group, chooses self-protection and collective
protection as Nash equilibrium strategies with the payoff function in
(6) and peasant payoffs are equalized across groups;
(II) No group could form so that it would yield a higher payoff to its
peasants;
(III) If security is imperfect, bandit payoffs are equal to those of peasants;
if security is perfect, Nˆb = 0.
(IV) Nˆp + Nˆb = N .
Condition (II) along with property (iv) above (whereby a peasant’s payoff in strictly
decreasing in group size) imply that all groups are of the same size. Then, condition
(III), again along with property (iv), implies that group size must equal k¯. The fol-
lowing Proposition summarizes the main attributes of self-governing equilibria.11
Proposition 1 Consider a self-governing equilibrium under Assumptions 1 and 2
under which each member of each group contributes both to collective protection and
self-protection and such an equilibrium has the following properties: (i) Each group
is of minimum size k¯; (ii) the number of peasants (Nˆp) is higher than the number
of peasants under anarchy (N∗p) and the number of bandits (Nˆb) is lower than the
number of bandits under anarchy (N∗p); (iii) the welfare of peasants belonging to a
group and the welfare of bandits is higher than that under anarchy.
Because the minimal scale for collective protection against bandits, k¯ , can be con-
sidered small the self-governing groups that will form will be of small size. We should
Footnote 10 continued
complicated. Let z˜ be defined by f ′(z˜) = k. Then, the interior equilibrium exists if
p′( f (z˜))(1 − z˜) > p( f (z˜))
(This condition is derived by evaluating (7) at xi = 0 and zi = z˜.) Otherwise, the symmetric equilibrium
involves collective protection only.
11 Note that, as specified, a self-governing equilibrium exists only if the integers N and k¯ are the ones that
would yield the exact integer number of groups. To allow for general existence, the definition would have
to be modified so as to allow for non-equalization of the payoffs of some individuals in ways, however, that
would make it tedious to analyze here without changing the essence of the comparative statics found.
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note that self-governance involves considerable coordination and decision costs which
would also favor small size and, in combination with the free-rider problem, could
render self-governance more problematic than it appears thus far.
4 Protection for profit
Instead of having peasants voluntarily provide a portion of their time for collective
protection, an entrepreneur—Leviathan, the chief, local lord, or Mafia don—could hire
full-time guards to protect peasants against bandits in return for tribute. His objective
would be to maximize the difference between his receipts from tribute minus his costs.
Receipts from tribute are likely to be higher the better is the level of protection and the
larger is the number of peasants. Thus, it appears that as far as collective protection is
concerned an entrepreneur could have incentives to provide it for profit.
4.1 A monopoly protection by Leviathan
We begin with the simpler form of market structure, whereby protection is provided
monopolistically by an agent coming from the outside. We call this agent Leviathan.12
Monopoly is also virtually the only form of market structure that has been studied in
other work on the profit-maximizing state and, therefore, we can make appropriate
comparisons more easily.
Leviathan can utilize the same collective protection technology introduced in Sect. 2
and satisfying Assumption 1. He hires guards to protect peasants against bandits but
also, at least indirectly, to extract tribute from the same peasants. Letting Ng denote
the number of guards, f ( NgNp ) represents the units of collective protection received
by each peasant.13 The extraction of tribute is also facilitated by an elite corps, the
praetorians (denoted by Npr , a fixed number), who also monitor the guards in the
duties, contribute to administration, and generally serve as a portmanteau variable for
factors we cannot completely specify here.14
The payoffs of the occupations of guard and praetorian are determined by how
much the peasants manage to keep. For given numbers of guards and peasants, and
self-protection level x by a peasant, the maximum share of output that could theoret-
12 Leviathan was a sea monster in the Old Testament and had various interpretations in Jewish and Christian
traditions, including the representation of the devil and satan. Leviathan was also the title of Hobbes’ famous
book of political philosophy, originally published in 1651, and it represents the sovereign to whom all the
citizens have given the authority of new absolute rule in exchange for peace. Here, Leviathan represents
the powerful sovereign without, however, his subjects ceding the right to resist.
13 For some of the results in a previous version of this paper, we allowed for f ( αNgNp ) where α ∈ (0, 1]
represents the proportion of guards that can be used for genuine protection, with the rest of the guards being
used towards the extraction of tribute from peasants. Because our findings do not change qualitatively with
this added complication, we chose not to include it in this version of the paper.
14 Wintrobe (1998) specifies a detailed model of a monopolist-for-profit state in which, in addition to
repression, resource expenditures to increase the loyalty of subjects is examined. Konrad and Skaperdas
(2007) provide a non-cooperative analysis between a ruler/leader and his supporters/guards. They identify
conditions that prevent guards from turning their forces against the ruler.
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ically be retained by the peasant is p(x + f ( NgNp )). However, as Leviathan has all the
coercive machinery of guards and praetorians at his disposal, peasants can retain only
whatever they can keep from being snatched away from them. One possibility is that
peasants can keep away from Leviathan what they keep away from bandits, p(x). More
generally, however, we can suppose a resistance function ρ(x) that indicates the share
of output a peasant can keep away from predators (Leviathan and his agents as well as
bandits) for any given level of self-protection x . (We suppose that ρ(x) has the same
properties as p(·) has in Assumption 2.) Bandits take away [1− p(x + f ( NgNp ))](1− x)
from each peasant, Leviathan takes [p(x + f ( NgNp )) − ρ(x)](1 − x), and each peasant
retains ρ(x)(1 − x) of output. Each peasant chooses x to maximize ρ(x)(1 − x) and
we suppose a unique such choice xˆ . Therefore, the payoff of peasants—as well as that
of bandits, guards, and praetorians—is ρ(xˆ)(1− xˆ), that is, we suppose that the popu-
lation sorts itself among the different occupations so that payoffs are equalized across
the different occupations, in a similar fashion to that under the anarchic equilibrium
of Sect. 1.15Clearly, there are many different possible outcomes in such a setting, with
the same individual being a peasant in one outcome and a bandit or guard in another
one, but all of these outcomes are identical in terms of payoffs for the population.
When ρ(x) < p(x) for all x ∈ (0, 1), we can say that peasants resist Leviathan
and bandits less than they can resist bandits in the absence of Leviathan. As Leviathan
is more organized than individual bandits are we should perhaps expect this to be the
more likely condition. Under such conditions, it can be shown that ρ(xˆ)(1 − xˆ) <
p(x∗)(1 − x∗).16, that is, when the presence of Leviathan reduces the ability of peas-
ants to resist, the welfare of peasants under Leviathan would be lower than that under
anarchy. Although we will first examine this case to understand some of its effects,
for analytical convenience, we will revert to the simpler case in which ρ(x) = p(x).
Since the number of peasants and bandits depend on the level of protection, which
in part depends on the number of guards, Leviathan takes account of the effect his
choice of Ng has on the number of peasants, Np. Then, in addition to hiring Npr prae-
torians, Leviathan’s choice variable is Ng, with the rest of the population becoming
peasants and bandits. That is, first Leviathan chooses Ng and the fixed number Npr ,
and, second, the remaining population sorts itself between bandits and peasants.
If, given a choice of Ng, p(xˆ + f ( NgNp )) < 1 and therefore security is less than
perfect, there will be a positive number of bandits Nb = N − Ng − Np − Npr . With
the payoff of a bandit equalized to that of a peasant in this case, the number of peasants
that would emerge can be implicitly derived. When security is perfect and there are
no bandits, the number of peasants simply equals N − Ng − Npr . Overall, for each
choice of Ng , there will be an induced number of peasants which we denote by the
function ν(Ng). Leviathan’s objective is to maximize his net receipts by the choice of
Ng provided these receipts are positive, while taking into consideration the effect on
15 A justification for using continuous variables for the different occupations both here and later in the
paper, please see footnote 6.
16 Given that x∗ maximizes p(x)(1 − x), we have p(x∗)(1 − x∗) ≥ p(xˆ)(1 − xˆ). Since p(x∗) > ρ(x∗)
by the fact that Leviathan can extract more easily than bandits can, we have p(xˆ)(1 − xˆ) > ρ(xˆ)(1 − xˆ),
thus yielding p(x∗)(1 − x∗) > ρ(xˆ)(1 − xˆ).
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the number of peasants as described by ν(Ng) :
VL = ν(Ng)
[
p(xˆ + f (Ng/ν(Ng))) − ρ(xˆ)
]
(1 − xˆ) − (Ng + Npr )ρ(xˆ)(1 − xˆ)
(9)
The first term in (9) represents Leviathan’s gross revenues (number of peasants
times tribute rate times output per peasant). The second term represents the cost of
hiring guards and praetorians.
We first show by example what can occur when peasant can resist less in the pres-
ence of Leviathan than in his absence. Suppose p(x) = x, ρ(x) = x2 and f (z) = z 12 .
Then under anarchy x∗ = 12 , the payoff of peasants is 14 , half of the population are
bandits and half peasants, and total output is N4 . Under Leviathan, xˆ = 23 , the payoff
of peasants and those of the other occupations is just 427 , but security is perfect and the
number of peasants is 0.9(N − Npr ), higher than that under anarchy for most values
of Npr that yield a positive payoff for Leviathan. However, because peasants who are
under Leviathan’s heavy boot do not produce as much, total output is 310 (N − Npr )
which for Npr > 16 N (but not too high, so Leviathan’s payoff is positive) is lower than
total output under anarchy. Thus, contrary to some of the arguments in McGuire and
Olson (1996), Leviathan not only may not improve output as compared to anarchy,
but also may actually leave a scorched earth of lower total output, as well as lower
welfare for everyone except Leviathan (or, possibly some of his entourage which could
be easily incorporated into the model). The key to this finding is the lower resistance
of peasants under Leviathan combined with an inability to commit on the part of
Leviathan not to take advantage of this lower resistance.
Having made this point, for convenience, we will focus for the remainder on the
simpler case of ρ(x) = p(x) for all x . The following Proposition summarizes our
findings with (part (i)) and without (part (i i)) a lower resistance by peasants under
Leviathan17
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. (i) If ρ(x) < p(x) for all
x ∈ (0, 1), then total output under Leviathan´s rule can be lower than total output
under anarchy. (ii) Suppose ρ(x) = p(x) for all x. If the fixed number of praetorians,
Npr , is sufficiently low, there is a choice of guards that maximizes Leviathan’s payoff
at a positive level. Such a choice has the following properties: (a) Total output under
Leviathan is higher than total output under anarchy; (b) Total output under Leviathan
may be higher or lower than total output under self-governance; the lower Npr is and
the higher k¯ is , the higher the ratio of the two outputs is and, therefore, the more likely
that output is higher under Leviathan.
When peasants can resist as well as in the presence of Leviathan as in the latter’s
absence, total output is higher than under anarchy (i ia) but does not have to be higher
17 It can be shown that when peasants can resist better in the presence of Leviathan (i.e., ρ(x) > p(x)) is
the only case in which peasants would be better off under Leviathan than under anarchy. Grossman (2002)
also finds conditions that lead to a similar finding (it occurs when bandits can take a lot from peasants). For
our case, we cannot think of circumstances that would lead peasants to resist better under Leviathan than
in his absence.
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than that under self-governance, despite the latter’s free-rider problem. The cost of
taxation as manifested in the high self-protection levels of the peasants, along with a
high fixed cost and small minimum size for the collective protection technology, can
make output under self-governance higher.
Large profits typically attract competitors. With Leviathan appropriating all the
extra income, we can expect competitors who would vie for a portion of profits.
4.2 Competing lords
Instead of having a single Leviathan and small-time challengers contesting his rule,
we will now examine the case in which all individuals ex ante are potential little
Leviathans or lords; they can choose this occupation just as they would chose to be
peasant, bandit, praetorian, or guard. A lord’s job is similar to that of Leviathan in the
hiring of praetorians and guards and in receiving tribute from peasants. We continue
to maintain the same assumptions about the technology of collective protection and
about the sharing of the surplus between lord and peasant. For simplicity, we continue
to suppose that ρ(x) = p(x) so that a peasant contributes x∗ to his private protection
and his payoff equals p(x∗)(1 − x∗).
The lord, however, has a major headache that Leviathan did not have. Other lords
are now after tribute received from peasants, and he needs to defend that tribute against
them. He can do that by hiring warriors to keep the other lords outside his territory
(and keep the sequestered peasants in) and possibly gain additional territory at their
expense. But then the other lords will respond in kind. Thus, the new element in
the lords competing against one another is that they will have to hire warriors as
well.
In this setting peasants have limited options. They are tied to their land and at the
mercy of the lords who compete over how to divide them up.18 This is a rather different
type of competition than the one typically assumed by economists, whereby different
jurisdictions attempt to attract mobile subjects through lower taxation or other privi-
leges. Whereas this type of competition takes place in much of the world today and
some economic historians (e.g. North and Thomas 1973) have argued for its impor-
tance in the rise of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form of competition
that has existed in the past or the only form of competition that is taking place today.
From Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or feudal Europe, serfs were tied
to the land and free peasants typically had no outside options, with rulers coming and
going but without any change in their incentives for production. Even in the past two
centuries, with the rise of the rights of man, the most liberal of states have seques-
tered their citizens with barbed-wire borders and passport controls. While we do not
deny the importance of tax-and-privilege competition of mobile subjects, we find the
18 In alternative interpretations, the peasants could conceivably decide to go it alone, but they would then
receive the same payoff as under a lord. They could also go “into the woods” where they would receive a
payoff that may be higher or lower that the prevailing payoff under a lord; effectively we are assuming that
such payoff is not higher than that under a lord. The peasants might also try to join a self-governing state,
a possibility that we will allow in the next section (where we can only find conditions that lead to an even
lower payoff than under a lord or under anarchy).
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complete lack of study of this other significant form of competition based on the use
of force as providing ample reasons for a first look.
Let nwl denote the number of warriors hired by lord l. For a given number of lords
Nl and peasants Np, the number of peasants that lord l can sequester, and receive
tribute from, is given by
q(nwl , nw−l)Np (10)
where nw−l = (nwl , . . . , nwl−1, nwl+1, . . . , nwNL ) is the vector of warriors hired by
the other lords. Also, q(·) satisfies the following properties:
Assumption 3 Let
q(nwl , nw−l) = h(nwl)
/[∑N¯l
j=1 h(nw j )
]
(11)
where h(·) is a non-negative, strictly increasing, and concave function, and
∑N¯l
j=1 h(nw j ) > 0. If
∑N¯l
j=1 h(nw j ) = 0, then q(nwl , nw−l) = 1N¯l .
Letting n pr be the fixed number of praetorians and ngl the number of guards hired
by lord l, the payoff of the lord can now be written as:
Vl = q(nwl , nw−l)Np
× [p(x∗ + f (ngl/(q(nwl , nw−l)Np))) − p(x∗)
]
×(1 − x∗) − (nwl + ngl + n pr )p(x∗)(1 − x∗) (12)
The main difference of (12) from Leviathan’s payoff in (9) is the determination of the
number of peasants: whereas in (9) the chosen number of guards induces the number
of peasants through ν(·), here the number of peasants is determined by the number of
warriors the particular lord has relative to other lords.
Initially, suppose the number of lords is given at N¯l > 1. We will next define a
notion of equilibrium in which, as earlier, the population other than the lords sorts
itself between the occupations that receive the “reservation” payoff of p(x∗)(1 − x∗).
Who becomes a peasant, bandit, praetorian, guard, or warrior does not materially
matter since they all receive the same payoff. Each lord chooses guards and warriors
strategically, but (contrary to the case of Leviathan) without taking into account their
effect on the total number of peasants (Np). All the occupational choices and lords’
strategic choices are made simultaneously and have to be consistent so that they add
up to the total population. The notion is similar in spirit to static notions in general
equilibrium in which some players can have some strategic influence on a variable.
We define a short-run lordship regime to be numbers of peasants N ′p, bandits N ′b,
and for each lord l guards n′gl and warriors n′wl such that:
(I) Each lord l = 1, 2, . . . , N¯l with a payoff function described in (12), takes N ′p
as given, and chooses n′gl and n′wl simultaneously with other lords so that these
choices form a Nash equilibrium;
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(II) N ′b =
∑N¯l
j=1 n′bj where for all j n′bj = q(n′w j , n′w− j )N ′p(1 − p j )/p(x∗) and
p j ≡ p(x∗ + f (n′g j/(q(n′w j , n′w− j )N ′p)))
(III) N = ∑N¯lj=1n′g j +
∑N¯l
j=1n′w j + N¯ln pr + N ′p + N¯l + N ′b
Part (I) of this definition is straightforward: the lords compete for “market share”
through hiring of warriors and the protection they provide to peasants, although each
lord individually does not take account of his own effect on the number of peasants.
Part (II) states that the number of bandits equals the sum of the bandits in each lord’s
territory, and the number of bandits in each lord’s territory is such that the utility
of bandits and peasants is equalized. Clearly, the number of bandits in territory j is
inversely related to the total protection level p j and when there is perfect security
(p j = 1) there are no bandits in territory j . Finally, part (I I I ) is a “market clearing”
condition, so that the Nash equilibrium choices of warriors and guards, the induced
numbers of peasants and bandits, and the fixed numbers of praetorians and lords add
up to the total population N .
The problem of existence of such a regime, although analogous to the problem
of existence of competitive equilibrium in neoclassical economics, is nontrivial. The
proposition that follows provides information on existence, uniqueness, and charac-
terization of the short-run lordship regime.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied.
(i) Then, each lord’s payoff, Vl , is concave in ngl and nwl and for any given Np
a Nash equilibrium in ngl and nwl exists.
(ii) If the Nash equilibrium n′wl s and n′gl s are continuous functions of Np on the
interval
[
0, N − N¯l(1 + n pr )
]
, then a short-run lordship regime exists.
(iii) Under any short-run lordship regime, each lord provides the same level of
protection.
(iv) A short-run lordship regime is unique in the number of lords and symmetric,
whereby every lord chooses the same number of guards and warriors. In such
regimes, (a) the number of peasants is strictly decreasing in the number of lords
and (b) each lord’s payoff is strictly decreasing in the number of lords. (The
proof is in the Appendix.)
Existence of the short-run lordship regime in part (i i) essentially involves finding a
fixed point for a certain function of Np; the sufficient condition invoked is analogous
to the continuity of demand functions in the theory of competitive equilibrium. The
properties of the short-run lordship regime in parts (iv), (a) and (b) are intuitively
plausible. When an additional lord enters the fray, each lord would increase his number
of warriors for a given number of peasants. Since the number of peasants is endoge-
nous, however, their number should decrease in equilibrium with the total number of
warriors increasing. A smaller number of peasants shared among a larger number of
lords is eventually shown to also yield a smaller payoff for lords.
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Additional properties would require employing specific functional forms. For exam-
ple, consider the following special case of (11):19





where 1 ≥ m > 0 and
Nl∑
j=1
nw j m > 0
The parameter m is a measure of how easy it is for a lord to increase his dominion
when he increases the number of warriors he hires by a small amount, the effective-
ness of conflict. Then, under examples for other functions we employed earlier,20as
the technology of conflict becomes more effective (m increases), the total number
of peasants becomes smaller. It appears that this occurs because lords compete more
intensely when conflict becomes more effective by hiring additional warriors, without
however changing their share of peasants. The effect of this additional demand for
manpower is to decrease the population pool from which the peasants are drawn. The
end result of an increase in m is a smaller number of peasants, a larger number of
warriors per lord, and a smaller number of guards per lord. Such an increase in m also
reduces each lord’s profits.
In the long-run lords should be allowed to exit and potential lords should be allowed
to enter and establish their own state. Since lords come from the population, N , we
suppose the long-run number of lords is determined by the reservation payoff in this
economy, which is the peasant’s payoff U∗p(= p(x∗)(1− x∗)). There will be no incen-
tive for lords to exit and potential lords to enter as long as the existing lords earn a
payoff that is at least as high as that of peasants, and if an extra lord were to enter he
would receive a lower payoff than that of peasants. Let V Nll denote an (equilibrium)
payoff of lord l = 1, 2, . . . , Nl under a short-run lordship regime with Nl lords. We
then define a long-run lordship regime to be a short-run lordship regime (that satisfies
(I )–(I I I )) and a number of lords N ′l such that
(I V ) V N
′
l













Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1–3 are satisfied and a short-run lordship regime
exists, under the conditions in Proposition 3(ii), for a sufficiently large number of lords.
Furthermore, suppose that if only one lord were to exist, he would receive in equilib-
rium a higher payoff than a peasant. Then, (i) a unique (in the number of lords) and
19 Hirshleifer (1989) has examined the properties of this functional form; Skaperdas (1996) has axiomatized
it as well as the more general form in (11). Note that if ∑Nlj=1nmw j = 0, q(nw1,nw−1) = 1Nl .
20 that is, under p(x) = x and the technology of collective protection is f (z) = zβ (β ∈ (0, 1)) the total
number of peasants equals
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symmetric long-run lordship regime exists; (ii) the number of peasants and the output
of such a long-run lordship regime approximates from above, respectively, the number
of peasants and the output under anarchy; in particular:
N
′





(The proof is in the Appendix.)
Part (ii) of the Proposition states that output and the number of peasants are almost
the same as those under anarchy. Free entry of lords essentially eliminates all the extra
production that can be achieved by the use of the collective protection technology.
What was previously taken by bandits under anarchy is now taken by praetorians,
warriors, guards, lords, and, possibly, by bandits as well, without essentially affecting
the total output that is produced. (If of course lords can extract more efficiently than
bandits can, output could be even lower than anarchy.) Literal anarchy is replaced by
a more organized, higher-level anarchy of predatory states.
5 Why self-governance is difficult
We now show how self-governing states can not in general coexist in the presence
of predatory states that are run by lords, even when there is no free-rider problem
in providing for defense against other states. We first define an appropriate notion of
short-run equilibrium that allows for both lords and self-governing states to coexist.
We then show that, under the examples, we have used in various parts of the paper,
the equilibrium payoff of peasants belonging to a self-governing state would always
fall short of the payoff a peasant could receive in anarchy or under a lord (when
p(x) = ρ(x)). Thus, it would not be profitable for such a state to form and a long-run
equilibrium with self-governing states would not exist.
Suppose there are N¯l > 1 lords and a number S ≥ 1 of self-governing states with k
peasants each. The lords behave as in the previous section and their payoff functions
are as in (12) (except for the slight modification of q(·) below, which has to take
account of the warriors of self-governing states). Peasants in self-governing states,
in addition to contributing to private and collective protection need to contribute to
fighting for their independence by spending some of their time as warriors. Let ws
denote the total resources spent on fighting (external enemies) by self-governing state
s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. We suppose that each citizen-peasant contributes an equal portion
ws/k to fighting; contributions to private and collective protection are as before volun-
tary (clearly, if contributions to fighting external enemies were voluntary, the viability
of a self-governing state would be even more problematic). Thus, the payoff of a
peasant-citizen is:
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To maintain their independence, the citizens of state s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S} have to
expend effort on war, ws , so that
q(ws, w−s, n¯w)Np = k (14)
where w−s is the vector of war efforts by all the other self-governing states, n¯w is
the vector of warriors of all the lordships, and q(·) is the contest success function
defined in (11) and appropriately modified to include the war effort of the self-govern-
ing states. We are now ready to define an appropriate notion of equilibrium for these
states, which is an extension of the short-run lordship regime defined in the previous
section.
A short-run integrated equilibrium is defined to be numbers of peasants N ′p, ban-
dits N ′b; for each lord l guards n
′
gl and warriors n
′
wl ; for each self-governing state s a
war effort w′s ; and for each citizen-peasant in self-governing states choices of private
and collective protection such that
(Ia) Each lord l = 1, 2, . . . , N¯l takes N ′p and the w′ss as given, and chooses n′gl and
n
′
wl simultaneously with other lords so that these choices form a Nash equilibrium;
(Ib) Each self-governing state s = 1, 2, . . . , S chooses w′s so that (14) is satisfied;
(Ic) Each citizen-peasant takes w′s as given and chooses private and collective pro-












nbs where for all j n′bj = q j N
′
p(1 − p j )/p(x∗),
for all s nbs = kps/p(x∗); and p j and ps are the shares of output kept away from












w j + N¯ln pr + N
′
p + N¯l + N
′
b + Sk
We will now derive the integrated equilibrium under the following functional forms:
p(x) = x, f (z) = z1/2, and the modification of (11) where the share of peasants of







It can be shown that lords choose to provide perfect security and all choose the same
number of guards n′gl = (N
′
p−Sk)/4N¯l . Lords also choose the same equilibrium num-
ber of warriors n′wl = (N
′
p −Sk)(N¯l −1)/N¯ 2l . All the self-governing states choose war
effort w′ = k(N¯l − 1)/N¯l . In turn, all citizen-peasants choose contributions to collec-
tive production of z′ = 1/4k2 and private protection of x ′ = 1/2N¯l − (2k − 1)/8k2.
The equilibrium payoff of citizen-peasants can be found by substituting w′/k, x ′ , and
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z in (1′′), and equals
U
′
p = 1/4N¯ 2l − (2k − 1)2/64k4. (15)
We are interested in comparing this equilibrium citizen-peasant payoff to that of
a peasant under a lord, which (since p(x) = ρ(x)) also equals the peasant’s payoff
under anarchy, p(x∗)(1 − x∗). Under the example, we are examining this payoff is
1/4, which we need to compare to U ′p in (15). Straightforward algebra shows that
U ′p < 1/4 holds for all Nl > 1 and for all k. Thus, a citizen-peasant’s payoff under
a short-run integrated equilibrium is always lower than the payoff of a peasant under
a lord or under anarchy. Consequently, there would be no incentive to form a self-
governing state under such circumstances and thus self-governance could not be viable
in the long-run. We summarize the finding of this section in the form of a Proposition.
Proposition 5 Consider the short-run integrated equilibrium under the following
functional forms: p(x) = ρ(x) = x, f (z) = z1/2, and the share of peasants of
lordship j is q j = nwl/(∑N¯lj=1nw j +
∑S
s=1ws). Then, the equilibrium payoff of every
peasant in a self-governing state is lower than under a lord or under anarchy.
The burden of defense against other states imposes such a cost on the individual
citizen-peasants so that there are not many resources left for internal protection against
bandits and for production.
We should emphasize that we do not completely rule out the possibility of self-
governing states being able to survive under some set of functional forms that would
allow this to occur. We consider then our counterexample to the coexistence of self-
governance and lordships and our inability to find any examples in which this can
occur as strong theoretical evidence for the difficulty of self-governance surviving in
the presence of predators. Of course, discovering conditions in other model that would
yield the viability of self-governance is an important topic for future research.
Another issue for future research is the generalization of the function p(x) to allow
the fraction of output help by peasants to depend on the numbers of bandits and peas-
ants. The absence of such a dependence has allowed us to essentially fix the payoff of
peasants and, therefore, the payoff of all other occupations. Whereas in preliminary
explorations of such a generalization we have not found any reason to believe that the
main qualitative results—the tendency of competition to yield less efficiency and the
difficulty of self-governance—would change, nevertheless it would be worth exam-
ining the more general case so as to confirm this conjecture.
6 Concluding comments
We have examined the provision of protection within a simple and stark context.
The framework we have employed has allowed us to make inferences both about the
internal organization of the states that could emerge and about their market structure.
While self-governance yields higher welfare for predator and prey alike, the small size
of self-governing states along with the coercive machinery that can be employed by
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predatory states make the long-run viability of self-governance problematic. Hence
hierarchy and predatory behavior towards subjects is the more stable form of internal
organization; and competition among such states for the rents thus created is the dom-
inant market structure. However, in contrast to ordinary economic markets, the more
competition there is in the market for protection, the worse it is—competing lords
and their entourages extract what would have been taken in their absence by simple
bandits.
A possibly helpful analogy is to think of the state as an onion, albeit with layers that
have different character and color. Layers of autocratic and coercive habits lie below
others with more democratic conventions, constitutions, legal codes, ideologies, or
norms that govern interactions in most of today’s states. Once in a while, something
occurs and pierces the modern layers leading to the previous ones that lay dormant.
Outbreaks of violence, coercion, and horrors can ensue. Our purpose in this paper has
been to improve understanding of what lies in these deeper layers, in the subcortex
of the State’s brain. In much of economics these outer layers of the state have been
taken for granted, a practice that in the somewhat tranquil post-World War II period
may have been harmless and typically useful for understanding economic behavior in
industrialized countries. But the inner layers of the state have always been making their
ugly presence felt in much of the developing world and more recently have systemati-
cally confronted transition economies. Ignoring the fundamental problem in providing
security and protection, and treating systematic deviations from ideal notions of the
state as aberrations would not appear to be a fruitful attitude. Looking into the inner
layers of the state is a comparatively easy task, because of their starkness and relative
simplicity. Understanding how the outer layers of the modern state, including repre-
sentative democracy, have appeared among seas of coercive governance appears to be
a more difficult task.
Appendix
We will employ Claim 1 in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 3.
Claim 1 A(z) ≡ p (x∗ + f (z)) − p (x∗) − p′ (x∗ + f (z)) f ′ (z) z > 0 for all
z ∈ [0, 1] when p (·) is concave (by Assumption 2) and f (·) is strictly concave
(by Assumption 1).
Proof Since p (0) = 0 and p (·) is concave we have [p (x∗ + f (z)) − p (x∗)] /
f (z) ≥ p′ (x∗ + f (z)). Therefore, substitution yields:
A(z) ≥ p′ (x∗ + f (z)) [ f (z) − f ′ (z) z]
Since f (0) = 0 and f (·) is strictly concave we also have f (z) > f ′ (z) z. Hence,
the term inside the brackets in the right hand side of the inequality is positive which,
together with the positivity of p′ (x∗ + f (z)), implies A (z) > 0. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 Part (i): For compactness, let ql = q (nwl , nw−l) , p =
p
(
x∗ + f (ngl/
(
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f = f (ngl/
(
q (nwl , nw−l) Np
))
. Note that Assumption 3 implies that ql is strictly
concave in nwl and twice differentiable. Then, Vl in (12) is as follows:
Vl = ql Np
[








To show the concavity of Vl in nwl and ngl , we will show that the Hessian of Vl
(with respect to those two variables) is negative definite. Letting ql1 and ql11 denote
the first and second partial derivatives of ql with respect to its first argument (nwl),


































































C ≡ p′′ ( f ′)2 + p′ f ′′,
∂2Vl/∂n2wl =
(








) = −Cql1 Np





Claim 1, then, A is positive. Since p (·) is concave and f (·) is strictly concave, C , as
defined above, is negative. Finally, since q is concave in its first argument, ql11 is non-
positive. Altogether, those properties readily imply the negativity of both ∂2Vl/∂n2wl
and ∂2Vl/∂n2gl . Consequently, the determinants of the first principal minors of the
Hessian of Vl are negative, as is necessary for the concavity of Vl .
The determinant of the Hessian itself is H = [∂2Vl/∂n2wl






which, given the calculations above, can be shown to equal
(1 − x∗) ql11 AB/ql . Given that ql11 < 0.A > 0, and C < 0, that determinant is
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positive. It follows that the Hessian of Vl is negative definite and, therefore, Vl is
concave in nwl and ngl . Then, for the given number of lords, Nl , and a number of
peasants Np, a Nash equilibrium exists.








denote the continuous functions mentioned in
the “if” part of (i i)’s statement. Then, note that the induced number of bandits for
























is a continuous function of the numbers of guards and warriors (compare with part II
of definition of short-run lordship regime), B (Np
)
is a continuous function as well.














I and II of the definition of the short-run lordship regime. To show the existence of
that regime, then, amounts to showing the existence of an N ′p that induces numbers
















































= [N − Nl
(
1 + n pr
)]
. Now, note that
for Np = 0 it is optimal for every lord to choose no guards or warriors and thus
have gl (0) = wl (0) = 0. Similarly, since without any peasants around being a ban-
dit provides zero payoff, we must have B
(
Np
) = 0. Hence, we have H (0) = 0.





1 + n pr
)) ≥ N − Nl
(
1 + n pr
)
. These two properties along with


















Part (iii): Consider a short-run lordship regime. The same level of protection would








were to be identical for all





also to be identical across lords. First note that ∂Vl/∂ngl evaluated at ngl = 0 equals
(1 − x∗) (p′ (x∗) f ′(0) − p(x∗)) = (1 − x∗) (p′ (x∗) f ′(0) − p(x∗)(1 − x∗)) =
(1 − x∗) p′ (x∗) ( f ′(0) − (1 − x∗)) which is positive since the concavity of f ′ (·)
along with f (0) = 0 imply f ′(0) ≥ 1 > 1 − x∗. In turn, this property implies that
n
′











x∗ + f (zl)) = 1 (where in the latter case ∂Vl/∂ng evaluated at zl would be
positive). The solution in terms of zl , because f (·) is strictly concave and p (·) con-
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cave, is in either case unique and identical across the different lords. Therefore, each
lord provides the same level of protection.
Part (iv): We first show symmetry and then uniqueness. Consider any short-run lord-
ship regime and let “ ’ ” over a variable denote the value of the variable under the regime.






x∗ + f (zl)) take the same val-
ues for all lords. Therefore, A ≡ p (x∗ + f (zl)) − p(x∗) − p′ (x∗ + f (zl)) f ′(zl)zl





ql1 Np A − p(x∗)
]
Note that these derivatives can be different across lords (and, for the same lord, across




/∂nwl . By the contest suc-
cess function in (11), it can be shown that
ql1 = h′ (nwl)
[∑






Consider any two lords j and k and suppose, contrary to what we want to show,
that n′w j > n′wk (≥0). Then, by the concavity of the payoff functions, the relationship
between these two lords’ partial derivatives, each evaluated at the lord’s regime point,
must be at follows:
∂Vk/∂nwk ≤ ∂Vj/∂nw j = 0
































































. These two inequalities, taken together,
contradict (A3). Therefore, our original supposition n′w j > n′wk is false. By a similar
argument we can show that n′w j < n′wk cannot be true either. Hence, we must have
n′w j = n′wk for any two lords j and k. This property, in turn, implies that q j Np = qk Np
and, given that z j = zk , we also have n′g j = n′gk . This establishes that any lordship
regime is symmetric.
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To show uniqueness, let n′w and n2w denote the choices of warriors associated with
two different regimes and w.l.o.g. suppose n2w > n′w(≥ 0). Then, the following rela-
tionships would hold between the pairs of derivatives:
∂V ′l /∂nwl ≤ ∂V 2l /∂nwl = 0
⇒ ql ′1 ≤ ql21
⇒ h′(n′w)/h(n′w) ≤ h′(n2w)/h(n2w)
But the concavity of h (·) along with n2w > n′w contradict this last inequality. Therefore
our initial supposition of two different short-run lordship regimes must be false; there
is only one symmetric regime.
Part (iv), (a): We have just shown that a unique and symmetric short-run lordship
regime exists for any given number of lords. The number of peasants in such a short-run
lordship regime is:
Np = N − Nb − Nl(1 + n pr + nw + ng), (A4)
where all variables are assumed to be at the regime values. From the proof of part (iii),
it can be shown that, regardless of Nl ,
ng = γ (Np/Nl) for some γ > 0. (A5)
That property also implies that the same level of protection is provided across dif-
ferent regimes, that p ≡ p(x∗ + f (z)) does not vary across regimes (and depends
only on the technologies of private and collective protection). In turn, that property
along with condition (I I ) implies that the number of bandits is related to the number
of peasants as follows:
Nb =
[
(1 − p)/p(x∗)] /Np. (A6)
Using (A5) and (A6), we can eliminate ng and Nb from (A4), which after re-arrang-
ing can be written as:
E Np + Nl(1 + n pr + nw) = N where E ≡
[
1 − p + p(x∗)(1 + γ )] /p(x∗)
(A4’)
If nw were 0, an increase in the number of lords, Nl , would clearly lead to a reduction
in the number of peasants, Np. Thus, for the rest of this proof we assume an interior
(Nash equilibrium) choice of guards (nw > 0). Then, the first-order condition of the
symmetric equilibrium under (11) implies:
h′(nw)/h(nw) − N 2l d/
[
Np(Nl − 1)
] = 0 where d ≡ 1 − p + p(x∗)(1 + γ )
(A7)
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Np and nw are simultaneously determined through (A4’) and (A6) and a change in
the number of lords also changes the values of these variables. Although we define
lordship regimes for integer values of Nl , (A4’) and (A6) are defined for real values
of Nl . Moreover these functions are differentiable in Nl , as well as Np and nw, and
the conditions for an implicit function theorem are satisfied. The marginal effect of
Nl on Np can then be shown to be:
∂Np/∂Nl = (1/D)
[




D = (d/p(x∗))H Np(Nl − 1) − Nl(Nl − 1)dh′(nw)/h(nw)
which is negative since




(it is the second derivative of the first argument of q((·) which, by assumption, is
concave). Since H is non-positive the term of ∂Np/∂Nl inside the brackets is positive
and, since D is negative, the effect of an increase in the number of lords on the number
of peasants must be negative.
Part (iv), (b): Next we seek to show that each lord’s payoff is strictly decreasing in




T otal output − (Np + Nb + Nw + Ng + Npr )p(x∗)(1 − x∗)
]
/Nl
= [Np(1 − x∗) − (N − Nl)p(x∗)(1 − x∗)
]
/Nl
= (1 − x∗)(Np + p(x∗)Nl − p(x∗)N )/Nl
= p(x∗)(1 − x∗) + (Np − N∗p)/Nl (A9)
Since p(x∗)(1 − x∗) and N∗p are constant and we have just shown that Np depends
negatively on Nl , Vl must also be strictly decreasing on Nl . 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 Part (i): By the assumptions stated in the Proposition a short-
run lordship regime exists for any number of lords, which is unique and symmetric - in
particular all lords receive the same payoff. Moreover, by part (iv) (b) of Proposition 3,
the lords’ payoff is strictly decreasing in the number of lords. For sufficiently small
n pr and with V l(Nl = 1) ≥ U∗p, there is a number of lords that yields a lord’s payoff
higher than that of a peasant (which equals U∗p). In addition, we can always find a
large enough number of lords (say, N ) that yields a payoff to a lord that is lower than
U∗p . Then, since the lords’ payoff is strictly decreasing in the number of lords, there
must exist a unique number of lords, N ′p, that satisfies condition (IV). Therefore, a
unique long-run lordship regime exists.
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Part (ii): Total output is proportional to the number of peasants (it equals Np(1− x∗)),
so we only need consider the number of peasants. From (A9), we have V N
′
l
l − U∗p =
(N ′p − N∗p)/N ′l . Solving for N ′p in terms of the other variables yields equation (13) in
the main text. Since the payoff of lords is strictly decreasing in the number of lords
and, by the definition of a long-run lordship regime, V N
′
l
l − U∗p should be typically
rather small, the number of peasants approximates from above the number of peasants
under anarchy. 	unionsq
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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